Book critic Maureen Corrigan

DATE September 17, 2002 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: Journalist M.J. Akbar discusses political tensions
between India and Pakistan and the war on terror
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

My guest, M.J. Akbar, has been observing the war on terrorism and the
possibility of war with Iraq from his perspective as a journalist in India.
Akbar is one of India's foremost journalists. He's written for The Times of
India, launched India's weekly news magazine SUNDAY, and is now the founding
editor of The Asian Age, an English-language newspaper which is published in
India and London. He's the author of books about India and Kashmir. His
latest book is called "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between
Islam and Christianity." The last few chapters focus on recent history and
try to explain how Pakistan became a breeding ground for terrorists. As a
Muslim living in India, Akbar is faced with Muslim extremists across the
border in Pakistan and Hindu extremists within India. I spoke with him
yesterday morning and asked first where the Indian government stands on the
possibility of war with Iraq.

Mr. M.J. AKBAR (Journalist): Well, the official Indian government point of
view is hampered by the history of India-Iraq relations, which, as is now
reasonably well-known, has been consistent and very good. Iraq has taken
positions which have been the Indian positions on difficult issues like
Kashmir and so on. So there is a history of accord which might not be very
attractive to Washington. But I think it's also very clear that India's prime
concern at the moment is not amity with Iraq. India's major concern is the
both regional, local, as well as the international fight against terror.
Because more than any other country, India has been affected by this evil of
terrorism consistently. It has bled India substantially. We have been
actually talking about this long, long before I think this subject came up on
the kind of radar map of Washington or America to the extent that it has done
now. I mean, our 9/11s happened many times over the last 15 years, 20 years.

GROSS: So India would support the United States in a war against Iraq?

Mr. AKBAR: India might not be too explicit about it because of regional
considerations, but I really have no doubt that if the case against Saddam as
a supporter of terrorism was made, then India would be in the forefront of the
support.

GROSS: What kind of case do you think India would be looking for? I mean,
what evidence is enough evidence?

Mr. AKBAR: The evidence linking him to al-Qaeda, for instance. I mean, the
international community, whether India or France or Europe, would want to see
that. Evidence linking him to any specific event--to 9/11. Were Iraqi agents
actually in touch with Mohamed Atta? I mean, has the CIA found credible
evidence for that? Yes. And I think if that evidence is placed on the table,
sure. Are there really weapons of mass murder that are being made in
violation of UN resolutions? So these questions are there, and the world is
not ready to accept a single viewpoint, but the world would actually like
evidence. And this much I can say, and I say this now personally because I've
been to Iraq many years ago, and the dictatorship of Saddam is a tyranny.

You know, I must add that the fight against Taliban and the writing against
Taliban--my real problem with the Taliban, long before 9/11, was the barbarism
that they inflicted upon their own people, upon the women in particular. And
you know, all through those years when Pakistan was supporting the Taliban,
Washington did very little. In fact, the oil companies, etc., were
negotiating with the Taliban all the time, you know, to get their deals
together. And some of us who have watched all this happening are relieved
that since sort of dawn appeared, but can't quite forget the years of
negligence which we might even call years of betrayal.

GROSS: So are you suggesting you think the United States might have an
ulterior motive now as it did in negotiating with the Taliban in previous
years?

Mr. AKBAR: I don't think any country does anything without an ulterior
motive. The point is that you have to sell that ulterior motive in order to
build the alliance, and if that is done, good.

GROSS: what do you think the ulterior motive might be in this case?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, I think, you know, one ulterior motive might be the simple
fact that you have not been able to be as successful in the war against
terrorism in South Asia, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan as you wanted to be. A
year ago, it was Osama dead or alive. Today it's Osama who knows where. And,
you know, given the fir--I was in Kandahar three weeks ago--you know, if you
have a minute--and I--one of the more remarkable things I saw--it was truly
impressive, believe me, as a journalist who has covered a great deal of war
and, heaven knows, violence--but the precision bombing that the Americans did
in Kandahar was--and, you know, they bombed Kandahar for six weeks during the
war. The precision bombing and the quality of military technology was awesome
because you could actually see just apartments taken out and the rest of the
house virtually standing and, you know, buildings next door untouched. So the
kind of technology that America possesses is absolutely awesome, and it's
certainly many, many generations ahead of what we saw in the Gulf War.

Despite such technological mastery, the fact that--you know, the Taliban
wasn't a certain individual. The Taliban was 20, 30,000 people. They were an
administration. It was a party. It was a whole movement. So my point is
that, you know, this war against terrorism is not simply a war of weapons and
arms, it's also a war in the mind, and that is troubling.

GROSS: When you say a war in the mind, you mean that this war--that the war
of terrorists, isn't dependent on having a terrorist government or one country
in which all the terrorists can gather in as a way of thinking, that can
continue in spite of the overthrowing of a terrorist government.

Mr. AKBAR: You know, if this had been television, you'd have seen me nodding
my head with, you know, great vigor as you said all that. You're absolutely
right. It is that. And the breeding ground for the next generation of
terrorists lies not only in the actions that happen today, but also in what is
the intellectual or what is the emotional washback that appears, you know,
with each event.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is M.J. Akbar. He's the author of
the new book "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and
Christianity." He's the founder and editor in chief of The Asian Age, which
is an English-language newspaper published in India that's also circulated in
London. It has a circulation of about 200,000.

I'm wondering if the United States does attack Iraq, what is the direct impact
do you think it might have on your life and on your country?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, I think we probably need redefine this. Is the United
States going to attack Iraq or is it going to attack Saddam Hussein? Is it a
regime change or is it a war against a nation? And I think within the
difference of these two perspectives you might probably begin to find the
answers. A regime change would probably be far more acceptable, even among
those who would squirm at the morality of the idea. You know, I mean, you
can't really run the world by saying that, you know, `I don't agree with this
guy and he has to go out.' I mean, it's really not the concern of a power or
a superpower to go around passing judgment on this man. But given the track
record of a particular individual--Right?--many people who might in principle
disagree with the United States would probably look the other way and say,
`Well, you know, the United States is doing a dirty but probably necessary
job. Let's get on with the rest of life.'

If this is converted into a war against Iraq, then the story becomes very
different, and, you know--I mean, the United States--I saw in Kandahar
American troops in little garrisons at the Kandahar airport protecting
themselves, not moving out, really barracked away. Are you going to--do you
want barracks like that across the whole region from Iraq right up to
Kazakhstan? I mean, you not--I dread the fact that you might be stepping into
your 21st century Vietnam, and you've got to think about this extremely
seriously before, you know, rhetoric or oratory or just, you know, private
selfish corporate interest begins to make every policy. I think Americans
must really think about this quite seriously.

GROSS: Are there risks in the region that you think are important to discuss?
If we do try to overthrow Saddam Hussein?

Mr. AKBAR: Risks? Yes. Yes. I think--let me go back, if I may, to
Afghanistan. What my great worry is at the moment, that the whole Taliban
movement, which was in such bad order a year ago, after the Bamiyan Buddhas
destruction. An evil deed, if anything, you know, and really would besmirch
the reputation of Muslims and Islam more than anything else that I can think
of. I might tell you that all the Muslim countries in the region, when they
heard that the Bamiyan Buddhas, including Iran, were going to be destroyed,
rushed in and pleaded with the Taliban that they would actually take these
Buddhas up and keep them in storage, you know, waiting for this nonsense
called Taliban to go away. But it was destroyed.

Now if today histor--you know, memory among people is the most vulnerable fact
of life. You know, suddenly a rosy glow begins to appear over the same person
who a year ago was barbarian. And if the Taliban begin to represent the
nationalism of Afghanistan, if they begin to represent that, then we have got
serious worries ahead. We really have serious worries ahead, because you
don't know where the war--this is a war against irregular armies. This is a
war against shadow armies. This is not a war against uniforms, and so we have
to be extremely careful. In Iraq--I mean, Iraq is a country with a strong,
you know, sense of national independence, and if that is by any chance--but
Saddam's whole philosophy, whole policy is to equate himself, make himself
synonymous with Iraqi nationalism. And, you know, if that is disturbed or
touched, we are walking into a hornet's nest of very serious proportions.

GROSS: What do you mean? What are the hornets that might rise up?

Mr. AKBAR: The hornets would be the hornets of revenge. The hornets would
be the hornets who would fly across little corners across the world. And you
do remember a superpower by definition is a power that does not live only at
home. If you want to conquer the world, you have to live in the whole world.
So American interests actually exist in Pakistan. The presence exists. And
the American presence, it has an economic form, which has a political form, it
has a diplomatic form. And everything suddenly across a huge region becomes
vulnerable to people who suddenly equate America with injustice, and if that
happens, you're looking at a very long story ahead.

GROSS: My guest is Indian journalist M.J. Akbar. He's the author of "The
Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and Christianity."
We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: My guest, M.J. Akbar, is one of India's leading journalists. He's the
founding editor of the English-language newspaper The Asian Age, and the
author of the book "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam
and Christianity."

The Senate majority leader, Tom Daschle, has asked a lot of questions about
this possible regime change in Iraq. He said, `If we strike Iraq
pre-emptively, does that set a precedent for India to pre-emptively strike
Pakistan?' What do you think of this question? What did you think about it
when you heard it?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, I think he has actually raised a very relevant issue.
India's nuclear doctrine is very clear--no first strike. On the other hand,
against a first strike almost total annihilation would be the response. I
dread that day, and you know, I think, Terry, that last summer in May, we came
as close as any area in the world has ever come to a nuclear confrontation.
I'm a normal human being. I promise you, it terrified the hell out of me.
And I'm also an Indian. And I was taking a flight from London to Delhi on the
day the advisory went out, and I know that day was particularly sensitive and
decisions were in the making, and the attendant at Virgin Airlines at London
Airport was--first time I've heard an airline say that they not only wanted to
give me back the ticket, but would be happy to accommodate me later, you know.
And the only answer I could give her, `I'm sorry, I don't know if you're going
to nuclear war or not, but I'm going home because there is no other place for
me.'

Those of us who have to live in India and want to live in India and indeed
dream that our children come back to India don't want an India and Pakistan
living under a nuclear shadow. Nobody wants it. But the answer is not in
good intentions. Good intentions are simply not good enough. The answer lies
in some principled polity being applied into that subcontinent. The nuclear
game is simply too dangerous to be left to generals, and I really hope that
the world understands that.

GROSS: How worried are you now that there will be a nuclear war between India
and Pakistan?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, you know, I know Indians and Pakistanis are mad, but I
don't believe they are completely insane, you know. I've been dealing with
the Kashmir problem, both in an individual capacity and as a journalist in
some form or the other, and I was talking to one of the extreme groups called
the Hurriyat, known to be pro-Pakistani, known to support violence in the
past, and we had this dialogue on the basis that violence and terrorism was no
longer acceptable as strategy or as--it was a complete no-no.

Now after we had agreed on that ...(unintelligible). And I told these nice
people--I mean, they just represented an anti-Indian group. And we were a
citizens committee. And I told them, `Look, the simplest solution to the
Kashmir problem is nuclear war. Nuclear war, no Kashmir, no problem. Do you
want that? Or do we need to now start walking on a bridge, walking on a
two-way street'--as I do use this phrase. Nothing really walks on a one-way
street--`Can't we get on a two-way street and begin an effort that stops what
would be a huge and horrible world calamity?'

Think of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Do you think that we have
all the sophistication to limit our war only to India and Pakistan? The whole
of the oil region, the whole of West Asia, the whole of Central Asia with its
huge resources--I mean, that's what the real international fight is about,
isn't it? Natural resources. All of it is heading for contamination. All of
it is heading towards a region where no sane person will actually want to
enter. You are going to have a world catastrophe, not just a South Asia
catastrophe, and I hope the world, and America in particular, since it is the
pre-eminent power of the world, wakes up to what the damage that India and
Pakistan could do.

GROSS: Now do you think America's war against terrorism is helping to
eliminate some of the threat over nuclear confrontation over Kashmir, or do
you think that it's intensifying the conflict between India and Pakistan?

Mr. AKBAR: What is the one thing that comes in the way of a dialogue between
India and Pakistan? One thing--just one thing: cross-border terrorism. That
has been an issue with Delhi. That has been an issue with India. We say, and
I'm glad that we say it, and I hope America understands, that if Pakistan does
not stop this covert support to terrorists, this is a non--terrorism is
non-negotiable. Now if America can lean sufficiently strongly upon Pakistan
to stop this, we could have the beginnings of a dialogue and we could have the
making of some form of peace, or at least a non-war situation, absolutely,
immediately. You would have it this winter. You don't have to go further
than that.

GROSS: M.J. Akbar is my guest. He's the author of the new book "The Shade
of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and Christianity." He's the
founder and editor in chief of The Asian Age, which is an English-language
newspaper based in India that also has a circulation in England.

You know, Pakistan is one of America's allies in the war against terrorism.
On the other hand, Pakistan has been a place where a lot of terrorists have
sought shelter. One of the members of al-Qaeda was just arrested in Karachi.
Pakistan has a lot of extremist Muslims who are fighting India over Kashmir.
Are you kind of confused now about where Pakistan stands on the issue of
terrorism and where Musharraf stands?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, one of the--I must here refer to Janus. We all know the
relationship we have to Greek mythology. The two faces of Janus, one looking
towards west, one looking towards east. Pakistan's position is something like
that. To the West it is an important ally in the fight against terror, but
towards the East it puts on a different face. But one of the major themes,
one of the major questions that my book seeks to answer is: Why are American
troops today in Pakistan and Afghanistan? I mean, why has Pakistan become the
haven and the breeding ground of the largest number of terrorists that you see
emanating? And I'm quite surprised actually at the lack of interest, or the
lack of connectivity that exists in America. Not enough people want to ask
this. Maybe because Pakistan is seen as a friend and you don't want to
actually sort of besmirch the reputation of a friend.

But leave emotions aside. The simple fact is that it's not just 9/11. You
know, Americans have forgotten that the World Trade Center was attacked
before. The World Trade Center was attacked how many years ago? And during
the trial of the attack, the person who was in charge--I forget his name, and
I don't want to take a wrong name. It would be wrong and insensitive of me if
I made a mistake. So the person I remember clearly--and I mentioned it in my
book--he dreamt of these towers toppling and promised that they would happen
again. And there was no follow-up. Each time, each time, whether the
terrorist is Yemeni, whether the terrorist is from any other country, all the
leads and the connectivities enter into some labyrinth in Pakistan.

GROSS: M.J. Akbar is the author of "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the
Conflict Between Islam and Christianity." He's also the founding editor in
chief of The Asian Age, an English-language newspaper published in India.
He'll be back in the second half of the show. I'm Terry Gross and this is
FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: Coming up, life as a Muslim in India. We continue our conversation
with journalist M.J. Akbar, editor in chief of the newspaper The Asian Age,
published in India. And book critic Maureen Corrigan reviews "The Lives of
the Muses" by Francine Prose.

(Soundbite of music)

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross, back with M.J. Akbar, the founder and
editor in chief of The Asian Age, an English-language newspaper published in
India. Akbar has written several books about India. His latest book is
called "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and
Christianity." The last few chapters try to explain how Pakistan, which was
created to protect Islam, quickly politicized jihad and became a breeding
ground for extremists.

As you point out in your book, "The Shade of Swords," Pakistan should have
become a model Muslim state.

Mr. AKBAR: Right.

GROSS: What were the hopes for Pakistan when it was created in 1947?

Mr. AKBAR: I think the hopes were actually tremendous, because, you know, it
was a nation without a history. It was a nation without a past and,
therefore, implicitly a nation with a future. In some senses, it was like
America, you know, when it was created and when it got independence.
Everything, every potential, was there to make it into a model nation;
particularly when, in the sort of breakup of the Ottoman empire, no Muslim
nation, because of reasons which are complex, and I don't know how many of
those reasons will find expression in our conversation now, but many of those
reasons, I mean, I deal with in some seriousness. Because no Muslim nation
has been able to create a modern politic. There is no democracy, and if there
is democracy, it's a kind of stuttering occasional democracy that you see in
Indonesia or now in Bangladesh. No Muslim nation has been able to
provide--it's one of the great paradoxes that the only Muslims who have
enjoyed consistent and sustained democracy over the last 50 years have been
Indian Muslims.

Now that doesn't mean that they don't have any problems. I come from a state
where I have to fight against the carnage in Gujarat, against the evil of, you
know, a state government using lynch mob violence against my community. But I
will deal with it. It's my country and I will deal with its problems. But I
am equally proud to say that Indian Muslims are the only ones who have
experienced sustained democracy. Why have the other Muslim nations not been
able to become--the government's no longer represent or do not ever--have
represented the street. And within that tension lies so many of the problems
of the street. Pakistan could have been a democracy. Pakistan could have,
but the elite that seized power in Pakistan was not willing to accept land
reform, was not willing to accept the kind of--it had inherited real estate.

You see a situation in Saudi Arabia where a government and a family has
inherited a country. It's amazing. Have you ever heard of anyone with the
audacity to rename a nation? This country was Arabia. This is the country of
the prophet. The prophet Mohammed never, you know, renamed this country
Mohammed-di Arabia. How can the Saud family turn around one day and say `It's
Saudi Arabia' and all the world sits back and applauds? And you feel as if a
decision of such consequence will have no reaction. It may not have an
immediate reaction, but history's not made up of, you know, this moment in
time. History is the next five generations.

GROSS: Well, let's focus on Pakistan. Pakistan, as you say, should have
become a model Muslim state. It didn't. Is there like one particular point
you could point to in Pakistan's history and say, `This is where it started to
go wrong'?

Mr. AKBAR: Yeah. It started to go wrong with the adoption of the first
constitution, which, by the way, was done by--the law minister at that time
was Brohi, which was a model constitution, a great constitution. I think this
was in 1955 or '56. Within a year of that constitution being adopted, the
military turned up and completely abrogated the constitution and seized power
in the name, as usual, of patriotism and national interest or whichever little
bit of garbage turns up in their lexicon all the time.

This next swivel moment in Pakistan's history came during Ziar because, you
know, a question at the heart of a nation--at the heart of every nation is why
was this country created? Now if you say that this country was created as a
shelter, as a rehabilitation center, as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims,
good, fine. But you cannot stop short on that road of logic. If you've got
to create a homeland, then you've got to create a homeland for all the
Muslims. The idea of Pakistan was not strong enough to sustain itself in 1971
and broke apart.

But came the next point, if I may continue. The next point was that Pakistan
was created in order to protect Islam; not to protect people, Muslims, but to
protect Islam. Now that took you into another dimension, because if Islam was
in danger, that is an absurd concept because no religion can ever be in
danger. Religion is a powerful fact beyond human beings. But if Islam was
going to be created--in danger, then obviously the government of Pakistan had
to become Islamic. And within the logic of this which Ziar introduced to
Pakistan came the state within the state and the conflict between the two
states.

GROSS: You are an Indian Muslim.

Mr. AKBAR: Yes, indeed, I am.

GROSS: Why did your family stay in India and not try to move to Pakistan
after the partition when Pakistan was created as a Muslim state in 1947?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, it's a complete fallacy to believe that, you know, every
Indian Muslim wanted to go to Pakistan. Lots of Indian Muslims did not want
to leave the cultural inheritance. You know, my father was a refugee in '47.
I wasn't born. I was born in '51, and he went to Pakistan as a refugee, went
to Takka, because we were living in Calcutta, and he came back in three
months. He came back to his devastated home, to his small town. And, you
know, when I was growing up, I remember this very clearly. My father was a
Victorian kind of temperament so he didn't particularly have any sense of
humor in the way we understand it, and we didn't have much conversation,
either. I mean, I wasn't yapping with him all the time. And it was far more
formal, if you remember, in the '60s or the '50s. And I once asked him as I
was growing up is, `Why did you come back from Pakistan?' And his answer
remains completely sort of, you know, part of my memory. He said, `There were
too many Muslims in Pakistan,' you know. He...

GROSS: What did he mean by that?

Mr. AKBAR: Yes, exactly. He meant he missed the variety of India. He
missed the culture of it. He missed the fact that he had friends who were
Hindus and friends who were Sikhs. And, you know, he missed his inheritance
of music and his inheritance of, you know, playing cards with a disparate
group of friends and all the things that you do in a small town.

GROSS: Now what are some of the things that you can do as a Muslim in India
that you wouldn't be able to do as a Muslim in Pakistan?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, I certainly won't be able to vote freely if I was a Muslim
in Pakistan, to begin with. I wouldn't be able to have a drink, I'm afraid to
say, no, as I do as a Muslim in India. Now I know many people are going to
get hostile to this answer, but I'm afraid, you know, as a believing
Muslim--and I am a believer--I also believe that Allah is merciful, and if
Allah is merciful, then I have to give him some reason to be merciful towards
me, you know, later on. But I'm not being facetious. I'm merely trying to
say, you know, that what we do have in India is the right to be free, and that
right to be free is not merely a political right. It is a social right. It
is perhaps the right to make mistakes. But it is the right to tell a clergy
that it cannot control my relationship with my God, that they cannot be my
interlocutors. It is the right to tell the clergy that they are not the
state. They are part of my, yes, religious practice. They are not the state.

GROSS: What are you up against as a Muslim in India?

Mr. AKBAR: I am against Hindu fundamentalism. That is the biggest problem
that I face. And, in part, that Hindu fundamentalism and its desire to
convert India into Hindu state has been fed by the fact that Muslims in
Pakistan have moved away towards a kind of fundamentalism. I tell you, much
against the wishes of the majority of the Pakistani people, I go to Pakistan,
no, they don't want a fundamentalist state. But this action and reaction is
of intricate interplay, and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, you know, and
its abhorrent manifestation in drives like the one we saw in Gujarat is really
the biggest problem. But then, you know, we are a democracy and we will fight
this. We will fight this. We will fight the Ku Klux Klans of India. Of
course we will.

GROSS: So you see the rise of Hindu fundamentalism in India as being a
response to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism?

Mr. AKBAR: In part, yes, yes. I mean, I must be objective and fair and say
that.

GROSS: But only in part.

Mr. AKBAR: Only in part, because, I mean, there is nothing which justifies
the rise of any fundamentalism. An excuse is not an answer.

GROSS: My guest is Indian journalist M.J. Akbar. He's the author of "The
Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and Christianity."
We'll talk more after our break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: M.J. Akbar is my guest. He's a journalist who's based in India.
He's the editor in chief and founder of The Asian Age, which is an
English-language newspaper that's also circulated in England. And he's been a
journalist all of his life, except for a couple of years when he was in
government. His new book is called "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the
Conflict Between Islam and Christianity."

Now when you ask the meaning of jihad, a lot of Muslims will tell you that the
main meaning of jihad is about the battle within, the battle for purity
within. You say that the other meaning of jihad, the meaning of actual war
and fighting, is being underplayed here. Make your case about that.

Mr. AKBAR: Yes. You know, it's become politically correct. Let me tell you
the story behind this. The prophet was actually returning from a jihad, and
as he was entering the city, he told his followers that, `Don't rejoice in the
military victory. The greater jihad is cleansing yourself from within, is
making the fight against your own injustice, your own problems.' And as a
concept and as a philosophy, that is one of the most powerful facts of the
Islamic creed. Nobody denies that. But equally, you cannot deny the role of
jihad in Islamic history. It is absurd to deny that role, and I think, you
know, some of the denial comes out of a new defensiveness which has come about
among Muslims. They didn't want to be associated with just their history,
because they are terrified of even their past success, even as they secretly
savor it.

The jihad is not a simple--the opening sentences of my book perhaps would
indicate this. `The Shade of Swords' is from a saying of the prophet, the
title. And the full sentence is, `Paradise is under a shade of swords.' Now
as an image, it's marvelous. I mean, it's almost like marriage where you walk
under a shade of flowers to the altar. Except that you walk under the shade
of swords, but to which purpose? Now that's the question. And therefore the
opening sentences of the book. `The shade of swords is not an invitation to
kill. It is an invitation to die.'

And here comes the spirit of martyrdom, which is such an important element in
the Muslim mentality when it comes to war. Give everything else--And what
could be bigger than life?--in the service of a higher cause and then comes
the bargain which Allah has made with the believer and with the martyr.
Paradise is not promised to those who have won a jihad. Paradise is indeed
promised to those who have become martyrs in a jihad. And, you know, this is
a significant point which will perhaps begin to explain to you why so many
young children who feel that, you know, for right or wrong, that they have
been victims of injustice, are ready to walk with bombs strapped around their
bodies.

GROSS: As a Muslim, how strongly do you feel you need to speak out against
the extremist brand of Islam that is behind today's terrorism?

Mr. AKBAR: I think it is the bounden duty--it's an archaic field, but I
repeat it. It is the bounden duty of every Muslim to speak out against Muslim
fundamentalism, just as it is the bound and duty of every Christian to speak
out against Christian fundamentalism, and every Hindu to speak out against
Hindu fundamentalism. We must confront the ogres within our own selves. It
is no point, it doesn't make very much sense for a Christian to come and
preach to Muslims that you must stop fundamentalism. No, preach unto thyself.
I mean, look at yourself. And only Muslims can eradicate Muslim
fundamentalism. Others can't. It's a given, and therefore we must mobilize
fully and totally and without any other confusion or deception in this fight.

GROSS: Do you think Muslims are doing enough to mobilize against extremist
fundamentalism and terrorism?

Mr. AKBAR: `Enough' is a difficult word to quantify, but I do know I want to
repeat the instance of Imam Ghazzali. Imam Gusley one of the great lawgivers
of Islam, and he was at the time of the assassins, and he gave a fatwa. He
said if Muslims do not stop terrorism, in the end they will not destroy the
enemy. Long before they destroy the enemy, they will destroy themselves. And
this is the message that has to be sent across to them. Use Imam Gusley. Use
your own lawgivers. Use your own solons and go to the text and you will find
the answers. Because this experience is not the first experience in Islamic
history of this phenomenon. Going to the past to rescue the future.

GROSS: A lot of people, particularly after September 11th, really turned
toward religion for some sense of comfort and understanding. But I think some
other people felt that religion has been responsible for firing up so many
wars. Does the extremist end of Islam make you feel alienated from your own
religion or do you feel more than it's your job to kind of reclaim the
religion away from the extremists?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, Terry, let me just put it this way. Islam would not have
lasted for 1,400 years and become a world religion if all it had advocated was
violence. No idea sustains itself with violence. The meaning of Islam is
peace. It's salam, it's peace. It was created as a force of peace. All that
it did was that it had recognized the reality of war in human affairs. It
would not shy away from that reality. Did the church ever shy away from
recognizing the reality of war in human affairs? No. You cannot. But once
it recognized the reality, it also circumscribed it.

Not many people know that jihad, that there are 10 rules of jihad which were
defined by Abu Bakr and Hazrat Umar, the first two caliphs who were really
successful. Among that, it is specifically forbidden to kill women and
children. It is specifically forbidden to hurt any innocents or to kill any
innocents or to wound any innocents. It is forbidden to actually destroy a
palm tree. You cannot destroy crops. When the armies of Saladin and before
him--Saladin is famous, everybody knows him, so I use the analogy. When they
walked, they would walk in the defile between, you know, cultivated lands so
that not a single blade of grass was act--all right, maybe that is too high an
idealistic a time and not everyone can be expected, but this is no--I mean,
terrorism is not jihad. For God's sake, it is not. You should not demean the
concept of jihad and you should not demean Islam by confusing terrorism with
jihad.

GROSS: Well, we're about out of time, but I have one last question for you.
You spent two years in government, from '89 to '91. You were a spokesperson
for the prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. You were in Parliament for a couple of
years. Apparently you didn't like it very much. You didn't stay in
government very long. You were...

Mr. AKBAR: I think they didn't like me very much, either.

GROSS: You were a journalist long before you went to government and you've
been a journalist ever since. What didn't you like about serving in
government?

Mr. AKBAR: Well, you know, to begin with, you thin has to be far thicker
than mine was--your skin, I mean, you know. Politics is the art of, you know,
using a stiletto and a knife in the back when it comes to real politics.
Number two, in our system, as it was at that time, it was very difficult--I
think things have changed a bit--it was very difficult for a professional who
had no, you know, independent means of income to remain honest as well as in
public life. And, you know, I was not used to sort of indulging in the--as a
journalist, one had a few sort of morals--not too many of them, but one had a
few and a bit of a conscience, and the mismatch was too much for me. I had to
get back into an honest job. Oh, as honest a job as journalism is.

GROSS: And has your experience in government changed the way you perceive
government when you cover it?

Mr. AKBAR: I think it has. I think it has. And in the positive sense
because I understand that government is not as easy a job as we sometimes from
the outside make it out to be. I think service in public life is also an
extremely difficult business. It requires a tremendous amount of commitment,
you know. You don't want to be woken up at 6 in the morning by somebody
saying, `The taps don't run,' but you have to, you know. And it's very
difficult. It's a difficult life. Yes, some of the rewards are glamorous,
but, you know, the hard work is there. Still, you know, you realize very
quickly that when you're not made for each other, you have to find a divorce
settlement.

GROSS: Well, I want to thank you so much for talking with us.

Mr. AKBAR: Thank you very much. It is wonderful talking to you. And, you
know, no conversation is a one-way street, either, so--and thank you.

GROSS: M.J. Akbar is the author of "The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the
Conflict Between Islam and Christianity." He's also the founding editor in
chief of The Asian Age, an English-language newspaper published in India.

Coming up, book critic Maureen Corrigan reviews "The Lives of the Muses," a
new book by Francine Prose profiling women who inspired the work of male
artists.

This is FRESH AIR.

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Review: New book by Francine Prose, "The Lives of the Muses"
TERRY GROSS, host:

In her first book of non-fiction, "The Lives of the Muses," critic and
novelist Francine Prose examines the fate of nine women who, throughout modern
history, inspired famous artists. But critic Maureen Corrigan says musedom
sometimes sounds exciting here, but she's glad that feminism opened up other
career options for artistically inclined women.

MAUREEN CORRIGAN reporting:

Francine Prose's new book, "The Lives of the Muses," is almost too much fun to
read. After all, a book that deliciously dwells on Dr. Samuel Johnson's
bondage fantasies, the pre-Raphaelite artist Dante Gabriel Rossetti's
necrophilia and Salvador Dali's fondness for decorating himself with human
excrement comes dangerously close to sounding like an extended version of one
of those dish-the-dirt biographical exposes in Vanity Fair. But Francine
Prose is no mere high-toned gossipmonger. An insightful and inventive critic,
as well as an entertaining one, Prose takes her historical exploration of the
role of muse seriously. If a little mud gets slung, well, it's all in the
name of scholarship.

Because the career of muse, especially after the advent of feminism, has
fallen into disrepute, Prose recognizes that she's got to first convince her
contemporary readers of the potential dignity and power of that role. So she
tells us a fascinating opening anecdote. In the spring of 1932, Columbia
University invited an 80-year-old English woman to New York in order to confer
an honorary doctorate upon her. The elderly woman was Alice Pleasance Lidell
Hargreaves, the originating cause of Lewis Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland."
Alice's honorary doctorate in musedom, Prose says, is very possibly the only
one in academic history.

The flair for the dramatic that Prose displays in telling this story extends
to her rollicking discussions of the lives and work of other muses. There's
Hester Thrale, the great lady who entertained Dr. Johnson as her houseguest
for 16 years and who, after his death, published anecdotes and a volume of his
letters to her. Consequently, Prose says that Thrail was the first muse to
discover that a decent living could be made, a more or less respectable
literary reputation earned by mining her relationship with her artist. There
were victim muses, like Lizzie Siddal, the copper-haired working-class model
for so many of Rossetti's paintings, whose suicide by overdose of laudanum was
provoked by Rossetti's flagrant infidelities. After Lizzie's death, the
shameless Rossetti took up spiritualism, summoning up the ghostly Lizzie to
rap on tables and give her opinion of his current paintings.

Also flitting around in this broad category is Charis Weston, photographer
Edward Weston's model, who, like Lizzie, degenerated into an art wife,
exchanging her lyre and flute, Prose says, for the diaper and dishrag. Prose
christens Lou Andres-Salome a serial muse because she inspired, in turn,
Nietzsche, Rilke and Freud, who himself paid homage to Andreas-Solome by
calling her `the great understander.'

The possibility of collaborative musedom is suggested by the odd symbiotic
partnership of George Balanchine and Suzanne Farrell. And then there are
those muses who are determined to play second fiddle to no man. Gala Dali is
in this group. So is Yoko Ono, the most reviled muse of our time. Prose
acknowledges that Yoko's harsh reception as an artist in her own right owed
much to race and gender prejudice, yet she refuses to second John Lennon's
estimation of Yoko as a genius. The insistence on being noticed, Prose
shrewdly observes, makes so much of her art seem more coy than profound.

"The Lives of the Muses" doesn't offer startlingly new biographical
information on these women and their artists. Instead, its strength lies in
Prose's skill as a gifted synthesizer and interpreter of familiar facts. As
such, she stretches her readers' appreciation of the different forms of
heterosexual love which certainly manifests itself in all shapes, sizes and
neurotic variations throughout these life stories. Reflecting on the glaring
absence here of male muses, Prose says that female artists seem less inclined
to idealize their male companions. In lieu of muses, they're more often given
male psychiatric nurses, like Leonard Wolf. Of course, men historically have
been less willing to act as passive enablers of women's art, the traditional
muse's role that Prose questions throughout her book. Being a muse, she
suggests, may oftentimes be a dirty, thankless job, but somebody's gotta do
it, or do they?

GROSS: Maureen Corrigan teaches literature at Georgetown University. She
reviewed "The Lives of the Muses," by Francine Prose.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.
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